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Based on the observation that industries are often geographically con-
centrated, this paper proposes a new political economy model of trade pro-
tection. We associate the sectors of a speciﬁc factors model with electoral
districts populated by continua of heterogeneous voters who differ in their
relative factor endowments. We show how strategic delegation leads each
district to elect a representative who is more protectionist than the median
voter. The legislature formed by these representatives then sets tariffs that
are strictly positive. Introducing additional policy instruments reveals a
trade-off between efﬁciency and regional targetability.
Keywords: trade policy, political economy, representative democracy.
JEL classiﬁcation: F10, F13, D72.
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11 Introduction
Economists like to preach free trade, yet legislators often turn a deaf ear. When-
ever the optimistssigh relief that the GATT/WTO has ﬁnally broughttariffs down,
another tariff or non-tariff-barrier appears under a different guise. More often than
not, the politicalrepresentativeswho push hardest for these protectionistmeasures
come from districts that are also home to the industry in question.1 This geo-
graphical correlation seems so common and self-evident that it has gone almost
unnoticed. Surprisingly, even the political economy of trade literature has so far
largely overlooked the phenomenon.2
This paper breaks new ground in addressing the inﬂuence of regional politics
on trade protection. True to the motto“all politicsis local,”3 we propose a political
economy model of trade that is based on two tenets: the geographical concentra-
tion of industries and the prevalence of majoritarian or ﬁrst past the post voting.
Our starting point is an off-the-shelf speciﬁc factors model, slightly modiﬁed as
in Grossman and Helpman (1994).4 We associate the different sectors of the spe-
ciﬁc factors model with electoral districts in order to highlight the geographical
concentration of industries. Each district is populated by a continuum of hetero-
geneous voters who differ in their relative factor endowments. That is, they own
1Take U.S. senator John D. Rockefeller IV of West Virginia, for example. His website
www.senate.gov/˜rockefeller tells us all about the senator’s many and ultimately suc-
cessful efforts to obtain protection for the U.S. steel industry. It will not surprise the reader to hear
that West Virginia is home to a large steel mill.
2In the context of political contributions, geographical concentration has been used as an
explanatory variable on the grounds that it facilitates lobbying. Mitra (1999) provides micro-
foundations for this line of argument.
3A saying attributed to the late Thomas P. (Tip) O’Neil, former speaker of the U.S. house of
representatives.
4We essentially use the same economic model. This has the additional advantage of making
our results more easily comparable to theirs.
2different amounts of the sector speciﬁc factor. These endowments represent the
individuals’stake in the local economy or, looselyspeaking, their local allegiance.
The residents of each district elect one of their own to represent the con-
stituency at the national level. We assume that these citizen-candidates cannot
credibly commit to a policy platform but instead pursue their own objectives once
in ofﬁce. The national legislature, formed by all these representatives, then de-
cides on trade policy. In doing so, it seeks to maximize the sum of its members’
welfare. Solving the model backwards, we ﬁrst analyze the tariffs chosen by a
given legislature. We ﬁnd that in the (counter-factual) benchmark case, where
every district is represented by its average voter, the outcome is free trade. Were
it the median voter, there could even be negative tariffs if the wealth distribution
is positively skewed. In local elections, however, the all-important median voter
desires a positive tariff because she ignores the negative externalities on other dis-
tricts. Anticipating the consensual decision making at the national stage which
would force her to internalize those externalities, she strategically delegates rep-
resentation of the district to someone who is more protectionist. The actual leg-
islators are hence more protectionist than their respective median voter and set
tariffs that are strictly positive.
There is, of course, a long tradition of explaining tariff protection along polit-
ical economy lines.5 Reignited by their seminal contribution, the ﬁeld has come
to be dominated by the “protection for sale” approach of Grossman and Helpman
(1994). Applying the theoretical framework of Bernheim and Whinston (1986),
they explaintrade protection as the outomeof a menu auction where lobbyingsec-
5Recent surveys of this literature include Rodrik (1995), Helpman (1997), Ursprung (2000),
and Gawande and Krishna (2003).
3tors submit conditional bids to the government, who then chooses the tariff vector
and collects the contributions.6 Despite the empirical support this approach has
foundinthedata,7 we wanttoexplorealternativewaysof howthe politicalprocess
affects tariff protection. Baldwin and Magee (2000), who empirically investigate
trade related votes in Congress, conclude that “while campaign contributions [...]
were important, they were not the only signiﬁcant factors determining how repre-
sentatives voted on the trade bills.” We ﬁnd this hardly surprising, given that the
protection for sale approach does not directly account for, among other things, the
geographical correlation alluded to above.8
This paper provides a complementary explanation, continuing where Mayer
(1984) leaves off. He focuses on factor endowments in traditional trade models
and combines these with a median voter political process. We take this one step
further and use a more elaborate political process in line with recent work on
political economy in the ﬁeld of public ﬁnance. As in Besley and Coate (1999)
and Ferretti and Perotti (2002), our political process features regional elections
under majoritarian voting rules and, subsequently, the ultimate policy decision
is taken by the national legislature. Unlike those contributions, we combine this
political process with a general equilibrium (trade) model9 instead of working
with ad hoc objective functions.
Virtually all political economy explanations of trade protection rely on the re-
6Ursprung (2000) calls it the “corruption approach” because such contributions tend to be
illegal in many countries.
7See the recent empirical studies by Goldberg and Maggi (1999), Gawande and Bandyopad-
hyay (2000), Eicher and Osang (2002) and McCalman (2002).
8It also fails to answer the fundamental question posed in Rodrik (1995), a point we return to
below.
9Admittedly, the simpliﬁcations borrowed from Grossman and Helpman (1994) somewhat
qualify this statement.
4distributive role of tariffs, despite their well-known inefﬁciency at the task. This
leads Rodrik (1995) to pose the fundamental question as to how to explain the use
of tariffs when more efﬁcient instruments are available. Our approach provides a
partial answer by pointing to regional targetability as the second relevant policy
dimension. The availability of an additional, more efﬁcient and equally targetable
instrument — sector speciﬁc production subsidies, for example — obliterates the
use of tariffs in our model as well. As soon as the second, more efﬁcient instru-
ment is less targetable, however, both instruments will in general be used. This
implies that there exists a trade-off between efﬁciency and regional targetability
when it comes to the choice of policy instruments.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the underlying trade
model and Section 3 lays out the political process. Solving the model backwards,
we analyze the policy choice of a given legislature in Section 4, determine the
outcome of the regional elections in Section 5, and combine both to obtain the
equilibrium tariff rates in Section 6. In Section 7 we analyze additional policy
instruments and Section 8 concludes.
2 The underlying trade model
This section introduces the trade model that will form the basis for the subsequent
political analysis. We choose a (slightly modiﬁed) speciﬁc factors model because
it lends itself to a regional interpretation in the context of majoritarian voting. As
in Grossman and Helpman (1994), we assume quasi-linear, additively separable
utility in order to keep the model tractable. Using this simpliﬁcation offers the ad-
ditional beneﬁt of making our analysis comparable to theirs. The model outlined
5below differs from theirs, however, in that it introduces a more explicit ownership
structure necessary for our version of the political process.
























, that produce under constant returns to scale. These sectors
















each uses its own sector speciﬁc factor plus one common mobile



















price vectors represent import tariffs (subsidies if negative) or export subsidies
(taxes). Sector zero is special in that it only uses the mobile factor. By appropriate
choice of units, sector zero turns the mobile factor into output one-to-one. Using
its output as the num´ eraire allows us to normalize the price
￿
￿
￿ to one. Strictly pos-
itive production in sector zero then implies that the wage of the mobile factor also




￿ if we abstract from trade protection














" that, at the same time, stand for the factor rewards of
their speciﬁc factors.
Each sector speciﬁc factor
￿ is owned by a continuum of agents. There are
￿
such continua — one for each sector — resulting in a total population of mass
￿
.
While all of them own one unit of the mobile factor, individualswithin sectors dif-
fer in how much they own of their sector speciﬁc factor. Denote the amounts they
own of the speciﬁc factor by
$
%
￿ . We allow
$
￿
￿ in each sector to be distributed ac-
cording to any statistical distribution with positive support. By appropriate choice

















￿ measures the degree of sector or local speciﬁcity of an individual’s fac-
tor endowment or, in other words, her stake in the local economy. Summing over
individuals and districts, we have an economy-wide ﬁxed supply of one unit of
each speciﬁc factor and
￿
units of the mobile factor.



































differentiable, strictly concave subutility functions. Optimizing subject to a given
income level





































































" of the num´ eraire.

























































































the consumer surplus per capita. Using the individual’s actual income, individual
$
￿
















































































































" via Hotelling’s lemma. Before turning to the political process, note



































￿ . In other words, free trade is indeed the optimal policy for our
small, open economy.
73 The political process
After having laid out the economic side of the model, this section focuses on the
political process. Our point of departure is the majoritarian component enshrined
in the electoral rules of most representative democracies, which gives rise to a
strong representation of regional interests. The representative nature of modern
democracies is hardly in question.10 As for majoritarian versus proportional rep-
resentation, in many countries the former plays a direct and sometimes exclusive
role in national elections.11 Where this is not the case we often see majoritar-
ian elements supplementing an otherwise proportional system. Furthermore, the
majoritarian or regional component often stems from an intermediate, regional
layer of democratic representation. The electoral system at this intermediate level
might well be proportional. The end result at the national level still resembles the
outcome of a majoritarian system if the federal representatives are selected by the
regions.12
How do these ubiquitous majoritarian elements relate to trade policy? The
crucial link is the observation that many industries are geographically concen-
trated. Examples abound: old industries such as coal mining or ship building have
located in the obvious places, other industries cluster in particular locations due
to agglomeration effects. Audretsch and Feldman (1996) ﬁnd an average Gini-
coefﬁcient of 0.56 for the location of industries accross U.S. states at the four
digit SIC level.13 We do not seek to explain the reasons behind these locational
10Admittedly, most democracies possess direct elements, Switzerland being the prime example,
but trade policy is rarely — if ever — submitted to popular vote.
11Although the nuances of countries’ electoral systems are a fascinating topic, we refrain from
offering a detailed discussion, being beyond the scope of this paper.
12An important example is the European Council of Ministers.
13Br¨ ulhart (2001) presents empirical evidence of geographical concentration in Europe.
8choices.14 We take this widespread phenomenon as given and investigate its po-
litical implications for trade policy.15 To this end, we associate electoral districts
with the
￿
sectors of our speciﬁc factors model. The implicit assumption that an
electoral district is the sole home to a single industry is clearly extreme. We use
this simpliﬁcation to facilitate our analysis and to elucidate the effects of majori-
tarian voting. The other extreme, namely a geographically uniform distribution, is
at least as unrealistic, and we want to explore the consequences of moving away
from it.
The political process of our model involves local elections where each district
elects a representative, and a national stage where the legislature formed by the
local representatives decides on policy. Let us consider these two stages in turn.
The choice of the local representative clearly depends on her behavior once she
becomes a member of the national legislature. In our model, so-called citizen-
candidates are chosen from among the voters.16 We assume that they are unable to
commit to a particular platform and instead pursue their own personal objectives
once in ofﬁce. 17 Election promises are possible but not credible and therefore
irrelevant. The election of the representative in each district basically amounts
to choosing her degree
$
￿ of local allegiance to the district. Due to the single-
crossing property of the voters’ objective function (Appendix 1 establishes this
property formally), it will be the median voter of each district who picks a citizen-
14Cf. Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999) for a treatment of the new economic geography.
15We acknowledge that companies could possibly choose locations based on where they would
wield the most political inﬂuence. However, we do not entertain this possibility in the current
paper.
16Theterm“citizen-candidate”was coinedbyOsborneandSlivinski(1996)whoprovideamore
explicit analysis of this stage, as do Besley and Coate (1997).
17Note that allowing for commitment does not invalidate our results. Instead it leads to an
interesting, alternative interpretation. We return to this point below.
9candidate — not necessarily herself.
At the national level, the legislature is made up of the locally elected represen-
tatives. This legislature, call it the house of representatives, then decides on trade
policy. By assuming that the entire legislature decides, we abstract from parties,
coalitions, and the formation of a government.18 In choosing policy, the house
of representatives seeks to maximize the sum of its members’ personal welfare.
Assuming such an efﬁcient bargaining solution seems natural in the context of ra-
























































Note that we assume implicitly that all members of the legislature have equal
say in determining policy.19
4 The legislature’s policy choice
Solving the model backwards, this section takes the composition of the house of
representatives as given. That is, the selection of representatives in their respec-
























as exogenously given. We want to analyze how this given
18A previous version of the paper explicitly modelled the formation of the government. This
does not affect our main result, however, and is therefore omitted here.
19It is straightforwardto relaxthis assumptionandintroduceindividualweights oneach sector’s
objective which stand for the importance or inﬂuence of the sector’s representative. In a reduced
form way, this allows us to integrate other approaches that provide the micro-foundation for said
weights: they could capture the monetary contributions of the “protection for sale” framework or,
for example, the advantages of incumbency,were one to model this aspect more explicitly.
10legislature chooses tariffs.
When deciding on trade protection, the legislature seeks to maximize its ob-
jective function (2) over the price vector





￿ . The corresponding
￿



























































































Note that the RHS can be written as a function of one sole argument, the price
of commodity









domestic supply of good
￿ in the denominator and, in particular, the price deriva-
tive of aggregate import demand (the second term in the numerator) — depends
on the prices (or tariffs) of other goods.20







but not on the types of the other representatives. In terms of political factors, the
tariff protection granted to a sector is thus determined — at least at this stage —
solely by the preferences of its local representative.
To analyze in greater detail how the political process inﬂuences the choice of








" are strictly increasing as long as we impose mild regularity conditions22
on the subutility and proﬁt functions. We can then rewrite the above ﬁrst order
20This is, of course, due to the separability assumption. Even without it, however, the effects











￿ functions closely resemble price elasticities of excess demand, only that
they involve tariffs instead of prices in the numerator and domestic production instead of excess
demand in the denominator. We will return to their economic interpretation below.





































































- , that is, as long as
the third derivatives of the subutility and the proﬁt function and the curvature of the latter do not
dominate the linear component.





















































" will also be strictly increasing. Further-









" have their horizontalintercept at
￿
￿
￿ , the inverted
functions have their vertical intercept at the world market price.
We are now in a position to discuss the political mechanism at work here. If
the representative of district






￿ would equal one













￿ , we see immediately that the average voter representing her district
would obtain a zero tariff — free trade in other words — for the industry located







" functions are strictly






￿ . The tariff protection offered to a sector increases with the local allegiance
of its representative. A representative who has an above (below) average stake in
the local economy obtains a positive (negative) tariff because the higher (lower)
the representative’s stake in the sector speciﬁc factor, the more she beneﬁts from
a positive (negative) tariff.
This argument, of course, applies equally to the one voter who is especially




￿ is skewed to the right (left), then the median lies below (above) the aver-
age and the median voter’s endowment of the sector speciﬁc factor will be less
(greater) than one. In the case of positive (negative) skewness, the median voter
would therefore obtain a negative (positive) tariff. Note that empirical wealth dis-
12tributions are typically skewed to the right, making it more likely that the median
voter would obtain an import subsidy or export tax for the locally produced out-
put good. These results are reminiscent of Mayer (1984) and Helpman (1997). In
our analysis, however, they are only intermediate steps because we have not yet
determined who will actually represent the
￿
districts.
Before turning to that question, let us take a quick look at the economic forces








" functions. To this end, it proves








































































￿ the price elasticityof import
demand inabsolute value, and
￿
￿ the ratio of domesticsupplytoimports. Note that
the LHS is a monotone transformation of the ad valorem tariff. Written this way,
the ﬁrst order conditions reveal that a higher import demand elasticity reduces
tariff protection, as one would expect in the light of Ramsey pricing. On the
other hand, a higher ratio of domestic production to imports increases tariffs, as it
ampliﬁes the tariff’s positive effect on proﬁts. In terms of economic determinants,
these are exactly the same results — albeit still preliminary in our case — as in
Grossman and Helpman (1994).23 The political process, to which we now return,
differs substantially though.
23We havedeliberatelychosentheir notationforthis versionofthe ﬁrst orderconditionsinorder
to highlight the analogy.
135 Choosing representatives
Having analyzed the policy decision of a given national legislature, we now turn
to the local elections that precede it. In each district, the electorate selects one of
its own to represent the district at the national level. These representatives then
constitute the national legislature. Beforehand, when participating in local elec-
tions, voters are fully aware of how their choice of representative will inﬂuence
the resulting tariff to be set by the national legislature. In our model, obtaining the
desired tariff is, in fact, the main objective of voting in local elections.24 The voter
pursues this objective by choosing the type of the local representative. Formally,
she maximizes her indirect utility function taking into account the dependence of































































































































































" are shorthand for the inverted ﬁrst order conditions (3’) of the
legislature’s optimization problem. Their reappearance here shows how the voter
anticipates the outcome of the political process at the next stage that was analyzed
above.
The ﬁrst order conditions that pertain to the voter’s optimization problem (4)
take the form
24Clearly, we are sidestepping the question of why an inﬁnitessimal voter takes part in elections












































Note that, except for the dependence of the price on the type of representative,
these are the same ﬁrst order conditions that would obtain if the voter maximized
her indirect utility function by choosing the price directly. This is due to the
fact that selecting the local representative affects the objective solely through the
price of the corresponding sector. We can simplify these ﬁrst order conditions by




























We see that the voter prefers a representative who owns
￿
times as much of
the speciﬁc factor as she herself. Obviously, the number of districts
￿
is crucial.




because it corresponds to a proportional






the voter would like to send someone who owns a higher share of the speciﬁc
factor and is therefore more protectionist than the voter herself. The intuition is
straightforward. A higher tariff, by raising the price of the locally produced good,
solely beneﬁts the owners of the factor that is speciﬁc to the sector in question.
The welfare cost, net of tariff revenue, on the other hand, is born uniformly by
everyone. Imposing a tariff thus entails a negative externality on other districts
that do not share in the beneﬁts but bear part of the cost. At the national stage
analyzed previously, these externalities are internalized because when the entire
legislature sets trade policy, every representative has to compromise. Anticipating
this internalization, the voter prefers to send someone who is more protectionist
15than herself.
Given the voters’ preferences, what will be the political outcome? That is,
what type of representative will eventually represent each district? As political
economy settings go, the local elections we have modelled are relatively simple.
In each district, voters differ along only one dimension, namely
$
￿
￿ . The policy
space is one dimensional as well: voters choose a representative from their own
characteristics space. Facilitating matters further, we show in Appendix 1 that the
above objective function possesses the single-crossing property. This allows us to
invoke the median voter result. For a wide variety of electoral settings, it is thus
the median voter in each district who decides the outcome. In other words, the
median voter alone chooses who will represent the district. From the above ﬁrst
order conditions (5’) we see that the representatives chosen by their respective




























We have thus established the following proposition:




), legislators are more protection-
ist than their respective median voters.
Let us stress the intuition behind this result. The previous discussion of voter
preferences obviouslyapplies to the median voter as well. The median voter could
in fact decide to represent the district herself. Yet her preferences with regards to
the tariff would then be watered down by the legislature’s consensual decision-
making that obliges every representative to internalize those parts of the cost that
are born by her colleagues. Anticipating such compromises, the median voter in-
16stead sends someone who owns a higher share of the sector speciﬁc factor. That is,
she strategically delegates representation of the district to someone who is more
protectionist than herself. That representative will, of course, also be forced to
compromise and internalize the total cost of protection, but she obtains a higher
tariff — as intended by the median voter — because her personal trade-off be-
tween costs and beneﬁts favors protection, due to a larger share in the sector spe-
ciﬁc factor. In broader terms, the consensual decision making process we assume
at the national stage would normally act as a built-in commitment device. This
device is leveraged, however, by the strategic delegation taking place at the local




) does the median voter choose to
actually represent the district herself. In that case, there are no externalities that
could be internalized, and the median voter would be the only representative, free
to set the tariff she prefers.25
Beyond this special case, the degree of strategic delegation is increasing in
￿
,
the number of districts, as we can see from equation (6) above. Starting from the
proportional case, where there is no strategic delegation, the ratio of the local rep-
resentative’s endowment of the speciﬁc factor to what the median voter calls her
own increases one-for-one with
￿
. This aspect of our result is also quite intuitive.
The cost of the tariff is splituniformly across the residents of all
￿
districts. As the
number of districts increases, less and less of the cost of a particular tariff has to





This stimulates the median voter’s appetite for protection and, at the same time,
25Note an interesting re-interpretation of our model if we allow for commitment: the median
voterwouldthenalwayschoosetorepresentthedistrictherself,irrespectiveof
￿ . However,instead
of strategically delegating she would strategically misrepresent her true preferences by commiting








￿ in order to obtain her preferred policy.
17sharpens the Damocles sword of the externalities’ internalization. Both effects
create an ever greater incentive for strategic delegation. Note that this compara-
tive static consideration implies that in a purely proportional system, legislators
would ceteris paribus be the least protectionist, and that their gusto for protection
increases as the number of districts multiplies. Our approach can thus explain the
varying fervor for protection of the U.S. president, the Senate, and the House of
Representatives. We return to this point below in the context of tariff levels that
are discussed next.
6 Equilibrium tariffs
We are now in a position to complete the picture we have been developing so far.
The main objective of every political economy model of trade — and we make
no exception — is to explain the trade protection we observe. So what are the
equilibrium tariff rates that will be set in our model by a legislature composed
of the above representatives? To answer this question, we draw on the results of
the previous sections and combine both stages of the political process. Plugging

































What can be said about these equilibrium tariffs? To begin with, we are inter-
ested in the sign of each tariff, i.e., whether it will take the form of an import tariff














￿ , the world market price. Clearly then, the equilibrium tariffs will be positive as
18long as the median endowment
$
(




. Since we normalized the
mean of each distribution to one, this inequality is satisﬁed, especially as
￿
grows
large, except for pathologically skewed distributions. For all empirically relevant
cases, we have thus established the following proposition:



















We know that, had the median voter chosen to represent the district in person,
the result would have been a slightly negative tariff (in the case of a positively
skewed distribution). We see here that, in equilibrium, strategic delegation allows
the median voter to obtain the positive tariff she prefers.








" are strictly increasing clearly show that:











As a way of elucidating the intuition behind this result, let us deduce it from
prior insights. We saw in the preceding section that the degree of strategic dele-
gation is increasing in the number of districts. The reason was that, as the number
of districts grows, an ever increasing part of the cost of protection is forced upon
other shoulders. This prompts the median voter to desire more protection and, at
the same time, to become more concerned about the looming internalization of
those costs. As a consequence, being keen on strategic delegation, she chooses a
representative with a higher endowment of the sector speciﬁc factor. This higher
endowment tilts the representative’s personal trade-off between beneﬁts and costs
19in favor of protection. Hence, the tariff is increasing in the local representative’s
endowment, which in turn increases with the number of districts.
As was already mentioned, this result has interesting implications in the con-
text of U.S. institutions. Take the U.S. president, for example, who (supposedly)
represents the interests of the nation at large. Our theory predicts that the pres-
ident should be less protectionist than Congress. This implication is conﬁrmed
by Baldwin (1985) who reports that “an abundance of evidence supports the hy-
pothesis that the president tends to be more liberal on trade policy matters than
the Congress.” We thus provide one possible explanation why the president seeks
fast track negotiating power and Congress is reluctant to grant it. Comparing both
chambers of Congress, our model implies that the House should be even more
protectionist than the Senate.26
The above proposition has another interesting corollary in the context of com-
parative institutional analysis:





lower than in a majoritarian electoral system.
The result is potentially testable.27 This being a theoretical paper, we only
point to the Dutch case for anecdotal evidence. The Netherlands is one of the
few countries with a purely proportional system and has traditionally been a free
trader.









" functions still contain the same economic mechanisms that we analyzed
26Also this implication is corroboratedby Baldwin (1985) who concludes that “the Senate does
seem more receptive to protectionist petitions from particular industries than the House.”
27Ferretti and Perotti (2002) developan index of proportionalityfor a large number of countries
that could be used to explain national protection levels. We leave this for future research.
20before. Substituting equation (6) into (3”) would show that the equilibrium tariff
rates depend negatively on the import demand elasticities (Ramsey pricing) and
positively on the ratio of domestic production to imports. We thus conclude that
our ﬁnal results exhibit the same economic effects that are present in the “protec-
tion for sale” approach. This is no surprise given that the economic side of both
models is identical.
7 Additional policy instruments
Having developed a new political economy model of tariff protection, we need to
investigate whether our approach suffers from the same shortcoming that afﬂicts
other approaches. They bring about the use of tariffs solely for their redistribu-
tive role. Yet, as is well known, tariffs are less efﬁcient at this task than most
other instruments. Once such additional instruments enter the frame of alterna-
tive models, tariffs perform a disappearing act. Our competitors therefore fail to
answer the fundamental question posed by Rodrik (1995), how to explain the use
of tariffs when more efﬁcient instruments are available. 28 The model we have
developed does answer this question by emphasizing a second policy dimension:
regional targetability. More precisely, there exists a trade-off between the redis-
tributive efﬁciency of a policy instrument and its regional targetability. As long
as the additional, more efﬁcient instrument is less targetable, our model predicts a
policy mix that involves tariffs.
As a ﬁrst step towards understanding this trade-off, consider another policy
28Grossman and Helpman (1994) offer an informal discussion of this question in the context of
their model. However, as Helpman (1997) points out, “good answers to this question are not yet
available.”
21instrument that is more efﬁcient but equally targetable. Sector speciﬁc production
subsidies, for example, are equally targetable, and they are clearly more efﬁcient.
As we rigorously show in Appendix 2, individuals prefer the exclusive use of
these subsidies and zero tariffs once both instruments are available. Because the
representatives have the same preferences, they only enact production subsidies.
We conclude that, in the presence of another instrument that is more efﬁcient and
equally targetable, tariffs disappear in our model as well. This was to be expected,
given that the additional instrument dominates trade policy. Before we move on
to less targetable instruments, note one interesting feature of this case (also shown
in the appendix): Voters desire and representatives enact higher rates of the more
efﬁcientinstrument(subsidies)thantheydoofthelessefﬁcientinstrument(tariffs)
when the former is not available.29
As soon as the second, more efﬁcient instrument is less targetable, things be-
come interesting. By way of example, consider income taxation, an important
channel for redistribution in practice that is clearly less targetable but more ef-
ﬁcient. In our model, it is actually distortion-free because, for simplicity, we
assume ﬁxed factor supplies. We conﬁne attention to linear income taxation as
progressive elements would needlessly complicate matters without offering ad-
ditional insights. Note that even linear income taxation implies redistribution,
because tax revenue tends to be spent uniformly, if it is not biased in favor of low
income earners. Let
￿
denote the income tax rate and let the tax base be factor
income from the mobile as well as from the speciﬁc factors. The per capita rev-



















, where the ﬁrst
term in parentheses represents the income of the mobile factor. Recall that there
29This result is reminiscent of Wilson (1990).
22are
￿
units of the mobile factor that are each paid a normalized wage of one. To
avoid corner solutions, we introduce a small ad hoc inefﬁciency. This concession




















, and strict concavity. Actual tax revenue available






















A given legislature then maximizes the following modiﬁed objective function
over the
￿







































































































































One such ﬁrst order condition is depicted by dashed lines in Figure 1. As
before, the higher the representative’s endowment of the sector speciﬁc factor, the











￿ not matter. The sickle shape of those curves
is due to the ad hoc distortion we assume. As the distortion increases in either
direction, obtaining a higher tariff becomes less worthwhile. If there were no
distortion, then those dashed curves would be straight lines radiating down from




























































On the LHS of this equation we see the average gross income of a legislator,
whereas on the right hand side we have the average pre-tax income of the pop-
ulation at large, multiplied by the derivative of the distortion function. Suppose
the representatives earn less income than their average constituent because of a
lower endowment of the sector speciﬁc factor. They then vote for positive income
taxation — giving rise to a derivative of less than one — that redistributes income
in favor of low income earners. This plausible relationship is depicted by the dot-
ted lines in Figure 1 where we abstract from the effects of the particular price or
tariff because it is negligible as
￿












everywhere, i.e., if there were no distortion, then we
24would obtain corner solutions.
Combining these ﬁrst order conditionsreveals the optimalpolicy mix of tariffs
and income taxation. The solid curve in Figure 1 shows this optimal combination.
Tariffs and income taxation turn out to be substitutes in our model because one
instrument beneﬁts, while the other harms those at the tails of the wealth distri-
bution. More importantly, though, we see that any policy mix is a combination
of both policy instruments. Without explicitly solving both stages of the politi-
cal process, we can therefore conclude that the more efﬁcient instrument does not
obliterate the use of tariffs, as is the case in other models. It does not because, in
our model, it matters that the more efﬁcient instrument is less targetable. We have
thus established the trade-off we set out to show.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we advance a new political economy explanationof tariff protection.
Our starting point is the geographical correlation that exists between representa-
tives voting for protection and the speciﬁc industries located in their electoral
districts. We account for these regional inﬂuences on trade policy by giving a
geographical interpretation to the speciﬁc factors model of trade. On the political
side, we augment this standard trade model with a political process that features
two stages. First, in regional elections, voters select one of their own to represent
each district. Subsequently, at the national stage, the representatives thus elected
form the legislature that sets trade policy. The consensual decision making pro-
cess at this stage forces legislators to take into account the effects a tariff for their
pet industry will have on other districts. In regional elections, on the other hand,
25voters ignore these externalities and prefer a positive tariff because most of the
cost is borne by other districts. Anticipating the internalization of these costs at
the national stage, they vote strategically for someone who is more protectionist
than themselves. The representatives thus elected are more protectionist than their
respective median voter and set tariffs that are strictly positive. It is the regional
structure as well as the interplay between the two stages of the political process
that bring about tariff protection in our model.
The equilibrium tariffs we derive are partly driven by economic forces that are
not unique to our model. Thus a low import demand elasticity leads to a higher
tariff as does a low import share. More innovatively, our contribution shows that
tariffs depend positively on the number of districts. As the number of districts
increases, the cost of protection is borne on more and more shoulders. Individ-
ual districts therefore desire higher tariffs and obtain them by means of strategic
delegation. This result conforms well to the differing degrees of protectionism
exhibited by U.S. government institutions. The other major innovation of our
approach is that it explains the use of tariffs even when other, more efﬁcient in-
struments are available. Whereas other approaches ﬂounder as soon as another
instrument that is more efﬁcient at redistributing income is introduced, we stress
a second dimension of policy, namely its regional targetability. As long as the
additional, more efﬁcient policy instrument is less targetable — as, for example,
income taxation — our approach predicts a policy mix that involves tariffs. That
is, the additional instrument does not obliterate the use of tariffs.
Despite the theoretical nature of this contribution, let us reﬂect on how our
predictions could potentially be tested. The most direct test would be to squarely
compare the stance of legislators on matters of protection to the beliefs of their
26voters. Closest in spirit would be an analysis along the lines of Baldwin and
Magee (2000), but with additional regressors such as regional concentration that
would capture the workings of our approach. Alternatively, one could extend the
sectoral “protection for sale” regressions by including such regressors.30 A third
way that was already mentioned would be to explore the cross-country correlation
of protection with a measure of the proportionality of the political system.
As for further theoretical work, some of the extensions that have been de-
veloped in the context of lobbying could be applied to our model as well. The
interaction between two large economies, for example, would add terms-of-trade
effects as in Grossman and Helpman (1995). Our analysis could also be applied
to international factor mobility as do Facchini and Willmann (2001) within the
“protection for sale” framework. In addition, developing an intertemporal version
of our model along the lines of Besley and Coate (1998) would allow us to address
dynamic issues, such as the time consistency of trade policy or the possibility of
prior commitment to free trade analyzed by Maggi and Rodr´ ıguez-Clare (1998).
Finally, it would be interesting to integrate lobbying into the political process of
our model as do Besley and Coate (2001) in a public ﬁnance context. 31
Beyond the trade context, the general principle that we apply in this paper
could clearly be brought to bear on other issues as well. One promising direction,
in our view, will be to treat the degree of regionalismitself as the decision variable
and thereby endogenize it. The allocation of decision making powers in federal
structures is a fascinating topic that has so far been subjected mainly to normative
30Goldberg and Maggi (1999) do include geographic concentration but only in the lobbying
equation.
31Their examples suggest that the political process we use tends to be robust to the introduction
of lobbying.
27analysis. Its relevance reaches back to trade policy, especially in the E.U. context,
an issue we have not touched upon in this paper.
Appendix 1: Single crossing property
As shown by Gans and Smart (1996), a sufﬁcient condition for invoking the me-
dian voter result is that the voters’ objective function satisﬁes the single crossing




























































































We want to check whether this function satisﬁes single crossing. Gans and Smart





































































































































































where we have surpressed all but the relevant arguments. Now suppose the ﬁrst
























































































































































































































































































This showsthat the voters’ objectivefunction satisﬁes the single crossing property
which is sufﬁcient to apply the median voter result.
Appendix 2: Production subsidies
Let us demonstrate the familiar obliteration of tariffs which occurs in our model
only if the more efﬁcient instrument, sector speciﬁc production subsidies for cur-

























￿ . The latter drive a
























































































































of the subsides that
have to be ﬁnanced, after all. Individuals’ — and a fortiori representatives’ —











































































































The ﬁrst order conditions for tariffs are the same as before, except for the third
term on the RHS. This term represents the effect a tariff has on the cost of the
subsidies via its effect on output. The ﬁrst order conditions for production sub-
sidies are similar, only the ﬁrst term on the right hand side is missing. This is
due to the fact that the productions subsidies have no direct effect on demand.
We see that for both (sets of) equations to be satisﬁed, the tariffs have to be zero.
This is because only
￿
￿
￿ eliminates the ﬁrst term on the right hand side of
the tariff equations which constitute the only difference between the two sets of
equations. So individuals would choose to use production subsidies instead of the
less efﬁcient tariffs. Since politicians are citizen-candidates, they have the same
preferences. We conclude that, in equilibrium, the more efﬁcient and equally tar-
getable production subsidies obliterate the use of tariffs as we had expected.
30Note an additional insight: Compare the level of the production subsidies to
the level of tariffs chosen when subsidies are not available. That is, compare the
ﬁrst two terms on the RHS of the tariff equations to the last term of the subsidy
equations. We see that agents choose higher rates of the more efﬁcient instrument
(subsidies) than of the less efﬁcient tariffs.
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